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Happiness, & Evil  
 
Tim Themi  
 
This article examines Bataille’s philosophy of art apropos of his express 
writings on literature. The aim is to see what program Bataille can offer for 
an aesthetics in terms of future writings of artistic works including “the 
novel,” which Bataille also wrote himself. First it discusses Bataille’s 1949 
article “Happiness, Eroticism, and Literature,” which posits literature as a 
quest for happiness, and compares this with his 1957 Literature and Evil 
which posits it, rather, as a quest for “Evil.” Then it explores Bataille’s 
writings on poetry, which invoke it as a way to smash through the rut 
prose literature falls into, in order to attain a more immediate experience. 
Finally, it turns to the need for separation Bataille posits between the 
poetic and rational that must also be a path between the two – and 
argues that a clarity of consciousness of these two distinct but related 
realms would constitute Bataille’s directive for future novels: to help us 
think within the real of their experience. 
 
Introduction 
It is in his 1949 article, “Happiness, Eroticism, and Literature,” where 
Bataille begins the analysis of literature by reducing it to a “quest for 
happiness” reduced, Freudianly, to “sexual pleasure.” But what was meant 
as a piece for the journal Critique he began editing after the war, in this 
Volume 2 | Issue 3: The Novel 
180-201 | ISSN: 2463-333X 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







case reviewing the sensualist work of surrealist writer Malcom de Chazal, 
soon produces some of the most profoundly nuanced thinking Bataille 
has had to offer on the deepest processes of creative writing – where 
happiness can seem like the very thing furthest removed.1 This article will 
examine Bataille’s philosophy of art apropos of his express writings on 
literature. The aim will be to see what program Bataille can offer for an 
aesthetics in terms of future writings of creative works such as “the novel,” 
which Bataille, famously, also wrote himself. First I discuss how his 
“Happiness, Eroticism, and Literature” posits literature as a paradoxical 
quest for happiness, and ground this with Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s 
contrary notion of “disinterest” as characterising the aesthetic sphere. 
Bataille’s 1957 Literature and Evil will also be considered in this context, 
positing as it does rather a quest for a kind of “Evil” in literature, which I 
will argue is the mark of an under-analysed relation between law and 
desire that fails to make space for periodically affirming the return of 
certain repressed or tabooed desires – and thereby consigns Dionysus to 
the Devil. Then I discuss Bataille’s writings on poetry, which suggest the 
latter as a way to smash through the rut that prose literature falls into, in 
order to offer us a more immediate experience – despite its absence of 
the ability to any longer form the unifying social myths for community. 
Finally, I turn to the paradoxical need for separation Bataille posits 
between the poetic and rational that must also be a path between the 
two, which I suggest are equivalent, in Lacanian terms, to the intimately 
related yet still distinct imaginary and symbolic modes of registering the 
often heterogenous real. I argue that a clarity of consciousness and 
affirmation of these distinct yet connected realms constitute Bataille’s aim 
for future writings and novels: to foster our ability to think within our raw, 
tumultuous experience of that which remains real in them. 
 
1. Literature’s Quest for Happiness connected to The Erotic  
This section considers the paradoxical “quest for happiness” Bataille 
discerns in literature in his 1949 Critique article, in order to eventually 
evaluate it apropos of the quest for “Evil” he later posits in his 1957 
collection of essays Literature and Evil, early versions of which were also 
first published in Critique.2 Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant’s seemingly 
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contrary notion of “disinterest” as constituting the properly aesthetic 
experience will also be brought to bear here – not least because 
Nietzsche is the major philosophical reference of Bataille and also at one 
point equates aesthetics with happiness, while subjecting Kant to a 
famous critique. 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s aesthetic disinterest occurs in Essay 
Three of his Genealogy of Morals, which sets out to deconstruct the 
ascetic ideal of self-denial inherited of our various Judeo/Christian-
Platonic traditions of the West.3 Here he dismisses the Kantian idea that 
“one can even view undraped female statues ‘without interest’” as bearing 
all the “naivety of a country Vicar” – despite any partly admirable 
pretentions to objectivity in the “spectator” in emphasising only those 
“predicates of beauty” which “establish the honour of knowledge: 
impersonality and universality” (GM, III:6). Nietzsche contrasts this not only 
with the story of Pygmalion, the sculptor who literally fell in love with his 
own sculpture, so besotted was he, but also to the novelist Stendhal – 
who makes for Nietzsche the far more accurate “sensual” and “happily 
constituted” appeal to aesthetic beauty as “the promise of happiness” 
(GM, III:6). And it is just this promise, endorsed by Nietzsche as the real of 
aesthetics “in the realm of the beautiful” from “refined first-hand 
experience” of it as a “great personal fact” – and an “abundance of vivid 
authentic experiences, desires, surprises, and delights” (GM, III:6) – that 
Bataille likely had in mind when beginning his own analysis of literature 
with a perceived quest for happiness. Although soon enough he comes 
across an essential paradox involved that extends our analysis beyond 
personal interest in what I will suggest is actually a hyper-interested 
Nietzschean way – involving as it does the “eroticism” that Bataille will 
define in Literature and Evil as “the approval of life up until death” (LE, 10). 
This paradox of happiness, which Bataille follows Nietzsche in 
seeing literature as a kind of promise of or quest for, occurs for Bataille 
because it can refer to the happiness of “both acquisition and 
expenditure,” which are different in kind and why our “representations 
vary in accordance with our frame of mind” (WS, 189). For the first sense 
of happiness is where “happiness is always confounded with the 
resources which make it possible” (WS, 189), because “before we can be 
happy we must find the means to be so,” Bataille notes, which means “the 
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thought of happiness thereby urges us to work to attain it” (WS, 188). This 
gives the happiness of security in the steady accumulation of means, 
wealth, and comfort, depending on the rational pursuit of determinate 
goals and interests in the sphere of work. The results of this work give 
what Bataille will note is the longer “duration” of happiness (WS, 190) – in 
a space governed by the taboos we place on certain of our animal 
desires and instincts pertaining mainly to sex and death. But by doing so 
for Bataille, “to recall its material data” (WS, 188), there is also a sense 
where “we introduce a distance between ourselves and happiness” (WS, 
188) – meaning that happiness is not complete unless there is a second, 
contrary movement for a happiness of transgressing such taboos. This is 
Bataille’s second sense of happiness which is that of the expenditure of 
accumulated resources, from the discharge of power, wealth, and pent-
up animal drive. It is the most intense happiness of the most transient 
“instant” (WS, 190), Bataille notes, and although it yields a most personal 
of satisfactions, it can risk going too far, beyond self-interest in the most 
“interested” of ways. Such are the movements of happiness that Bataille 
posits as the essentially violent conflict of literature, reflecting “these 
violent contrary movements within us” (WS, 187). 
When it comes to life, Bataille had already discerned before turning 
to discuss literature that this conflict of happiness is because “for man the 
sexual act is animality,” where “man in a normal state” often “condemns it” 
– for potentially it “consumes our reserves” to such an extent that it 
“frightens us because it enraptures us and it enraptures us all the more 
profoundly because it frightens us” (WS, 186-7). Lacan’s Seminar VII 
articulation of the “jouissance [enjoyment] of transgression” as the 
“original state” or least “indirect” form of drive satisfaction – going beyond 
our usual pleasure principles delimited by the reality principle by 
transgressing the moral taboos that usually constrain us – speaks to this 
frightful enrapturing as well. As does Lacan’s later Seminar XVII depiction 
of jouissance as that which “begins with a tickle and ends in a blaze of 
petrol.”4 And it is with these insights in mind that Bataille can express that 
while “sexual pleasure is by its very nature happiness,” “one of resolution 
and gushing forth,” it “nevertheless has the sense of unhappiness” (WS, 
186) – since direct sexual happiness is what we must shed in order to 
work to gain the means to acquire it, consigning it to the absence of 
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night. This is such for Bataille that “either we betray our truth of the night 
during the day,” where we are under the sway of taboo and fixated 
neurotically on the happiness of security and accumulation, “or we 
hypocritically aspire simply to denounce the conventions of the day” (WS, 
187) – where instead we enter the perverse space of transgression and 
the deepest form of satisfaction so powerful in its sovereignty that we 
may never wish to return, and believe this is all too possible. 
Bataille laments how the two conflicting happinesses of 
accumulation and expenditure both seem to confine us “within the 
conditions of falsehood” and are specially “found in literature, to which 
they give the disguised face of truth” (WS, 187). And by noting this truth as 
disguised, Bataille is pointing to our varying degrees of unconsciousness 
about the two forms of happiness – a lack of clarity which plays out in 
different types of literature negatively in various ways. Here we find 
literature simulating, stimulating, staging, and intensifying their conflict 
even while masking it –such that Bataille will remark that the “quest for 
happiness that causes us to write or read seems in truth to have the 
contrary meaning of unhappiness” (WS, 187). He points to how tragedy, 
for instance, often “brings terror rather than pleasure,” and how even the 
“joy of comedy” is “equivocal,” involving laughing at “misfortune” (WS, 187) 
– while the novel also “requires vicissitudes which produce anguish” 
because actually “the depiction of happiness,” pure and simple, “is boring” 
(WS, 187). This is such for Bataille that literature even portrays a “vocation 
for unhappiness,” which means “if the writer evokes pleasure he does so 
with dark overtones suggesting something distressing” (WS, 187). 
We get a sense for what Bataille’s directive for literature would be 
when he sets his critical gaze to it through this happiness-unhappiness 
dynamic he is offering. Here he laments the “recent literature” that also 
“covets happiness too much,” to the point of “poetic insipidity,” with a 
recent anthology of it giving “the feeling of defeat” (WS, 187). He contrasts 
this with classical tragedy where actually “the unhappiness serves as a 
stimulant, a failure which reveals the power to confront it” (WS, 188) –
such as in Sophocles’ Antigone where Lacan traces Antigone’s “beauty 
effect” (SVII, 281) as the lure for us to face and affirm our tragic, 
transgressive, incestuous truth. But now instead we get “this feeble 
display of failure or shameful pleasures,” such that at any point “if the 
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body triumphs, language,” Bataille laments, “has the power only to 
acknowledge a movement of retreat” (WS, 187). This retreat is where 
“recent literature” for Bataille, “as it portrays sexual pleasure, tends more 
strangely to betray happiness and to misunderstand the poetic sense of 
unhappiness” – leading it to neurotically “deny joy without having affirmed 
it” (WS, 188). And the end result is thus an unsatisfying “tribute to 
unhappiness – which balances a desire for the happiness it really is” (WS, 
188), resulting overall in “the rhetoric of unhappiness,” where, Bataille 
concludes, “literature becomes weary and cannot really discover its initial 
pure blaze” (WS, 192). 
So much for the initial quest for happiness literature had promised, 
at least from the initial vantage point that Bataille seemed to share with 
Nietzsche and Stendhal at the price of Kant. But what Bataille is 
diagnosing here with this loss of literature’s initial pure blaze is our loss of 
the ability to properly experience, understand, and thereby genuinely 
depict what he calls the “felicitous animality” of happiness that comes 
from transgression. This is because we remain fixated instead at the 
petrified level of an all-too human taboo, governing the space of work and 
acquisition by morality and reason, by means-ends calculations 
concerning further growth in acquisitions in the future. And we can see 
the fixation to this realm playing out in literature as what Bataille calls the 
“absence of incisive movements of anguish,” or the “reduction of 
‘privileged moments’” (WS, 188) – where one can no longer experience 
the sovereignty of what Lacan directly calls “jouissance of transgression” 
(SVII, 195), or later in his Seminar XXIII on the writer James Joyce the 
“jouissance of the real.”5  
This loss of incisive moments is due to what we can note with Lacan’s 
Seminar X is the anxiety acting as a “signal” or “fault-line” of the oncoming 
real and causing us to retreat, due to the potential masochism involved 
beyond the pleasure principle: where “masochism” is what Lacan later 
noted in Seminar XXIII can be “the main share of the jouissance endued 
by the real” (SXXIII, 63).6 So what we get instead, due to this retreat before 
our deepest desire, which would reach the real, is what Bataille notes is 
the “predominance of everyday life” (WS, 188): which harkens to 
Nietzsche’s critique of Socrates’ Euripides for causing the condescension 
of Greek Tragedy from its “bold traits” to the “civic mediocrity” of the herd7 
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– where taboos of moral-rationalism lord it over desire and reign too 
supreme across all times, even in our best artistic spaces meant for 
release. This is where Bataille will lament that “happiness is confounded 
with the resources which make it possible” (WS, 189), which in a 
humanity now utterly “devoted to the world of things and reason” – in a 
way so “stubborn” it very much recalls our lost or latent “animality” (WS, 
190) –eventually, when the repressed drive returns condensed in a 
symptom or displaced in an acting out, “consigns our most intimate 
moments to something monstrous, something shameful” (WS, 190). 
 
2. Literature as the Condescension of Desire into Evil  
In the previous section we arrived at the loss of the primal, animal sense 
of happiness important to humankind in life and literature, a loss which 
figurately consigns Dionysos – the Greek god of sexual ecstasy, 
intoxication, and transgression – to the Judeo-Christian Devil. Now we 
turn to Bataille’s 1957 Literature and Evil to examine further this process, 
where the happiness initially promised of literature seems to condescend 
to a demand for Evil. 
The very final work Bataille published in his oeuvre, the 1961 Tears 
of Eros, gives the key to this literary demand for Evil – by documenting 
eroticism’s loss and distortion across the history of painting, particularly in 
the Christian era. Here Bataille notes the annulment of any adequate 
positive space for the erotic return of prohibited libidinal impulses, 
meaning they could only reappear “distorted,” “piously cursed,” in 
monstrous representations of self-immolation, sadistic crime, the Devil, 
and the fires of Hell.8 And this is precisely what to keep in mind when 
approaching Bataille’s earlier 1957 Literature and Evil collection, which 
focusses on novels such as Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights and 
William Blake’s poem Heaven and Hell – at the birth of the modern world 
and the romantic reactions to its excess where, Nietzsche notes, the 
abnegations of Christianity are preserved in the same old ascetic ideal 
only streamlined of its religious “exteriors, its guise and masquerade” (GM, 
III:25), into a purer, more rationalised form.  
This hyper-rational modern world thereby consigns the erotic to the 
irrational, the origins of which are in the Christian reduction of eroticism to 
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Evil. And in between is Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights, which Bataille 
calls “surely the most beautiful and most profoundly violent love story,” 
and “one of the greatest books ever written” (LE, 9). Here Bataille notes 
that “there is no character in romantic literature who comes across more 
convincingly or more simply than Heathcliff” – in the “basic state” of “the 
child in revolt against the world of Good” and the “adult world” and 
“committed, in his revolt, to the side of Evil” (LE, 13). This commitment is 
such that “there is no law which Heathcliff does not enjoy breaking” (LE, 
13), and Bataille cites the 1955 study of Jacques Blondel to compare 
Heathcliff’s speech to the executioners in de Sade’s Justine – where the 
act of “destruction” is valorised to yield a “divine,” “sensual,” “ecstasy” like 
no other and at the very least, Heathcliff would add, to “treat” oneself to 
“an evening’s amusement” (LE, 13-4).9 
Despite these monstrous emissions, or perhaps even because of 
their elemental excess, Bataille finds that “Wuthering Heights has a 
certain affinity with Greek tragedy” – for “the subject of the novel is the 
tragic violation of law,” where the author “agreed with the law,” but the 
“emotional impact” of the play is actually “communicating the sympathy” 
that was felt “for the transgressor” (LE, 14). Bataille explains this sympathy 
in terms of the lure one feels for “forbidden” fruits––where “the ban 
beautifies that to which it prevents access,” which serves to “magnify it,” 
and is “no less an invitation at the same time as it is an obstacle” (LE, 15). 
And we can find Lacan two years later in his Ethics Seminar similarly 
noting the eternal “attraction of transgression,” which, among “religious 
circles,” only a “comic optimism” could ever hope to fully suppress (SVII, 
2). In any case it is the excessive violence of the transgressor – whether it 
be incest, parricide, or self-enucleation in the case of tragedy, or the 
necrophilia and sadistic, vengeful torture of Wuthering Heights – which 
suggests a corresponding excess of taboo that thereby both requires, and 
causes, an equal opposite force to allow for the drive’s sublimated 
release. And this explains why in his 1958 Television interview on 
Literature and Evil, Bataille perhaps cryptically refers to both the force of 
taboo and the violence of transgression as “two opposite kinds of Evil.”10  
These two forms of evil are in actual fact related to the two forms of 
happiness we earlier discussed, where the happiness of social security 
coming from taboo, moral law, and accumulation sees the happiness of 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







transgression and expenditure as Evil: and vice versa – where the 
happiness of transgression looks upon the violent imposition of taboo 
back to stop it as the real and actual Evil. Both sides of this equation are, 
of course, coequal for Bataille: transgression for release, and taboo to 
gives us something in reserve to later release – and part of the essential 
conflict of life that is paraded with various levels of clarity, or lack thereof, 
in our various kinds of literature. By adding more consciousness or clarity 
about our conflictual inter-relation, however, Bataille would like to lessen 
the “evil” wretchedness that each side of the relation, and thus our whole 
contradictory totality itself, may otherwise take. And we can see this in his 
turn to the poetry of William Blake, who much like ourselves to this day, 
Bataille notes, could not quite “solve this contradiction” where “by 
affirming Evil Blake was affirming liberty,” even though “the liberty of Evil is 
also the negation of liberty” (LE, 78) – but nevertheless he still managed 
“to restore life to original energy” (LE, 80).  
Bataille begins his Blake chapter in Literature and Evil with the 
pronouncement, “If I had to name those English writers who moved me 
most, they would be John Ford, Emily Brontë, and William Blake” – for “in 
the excessive violence of their work, Evil attains a form of purity” (LE, 65). 
In Blake’s case this was to “reduce humanity to poetry and poetry to Evil” 
(LE, 65), but this is no longer the evil of slow, sadistic torture and murder 
of other traditions founded on the suppression of the fullness of libido: 
Rather, Bataille notes, “He wrote an apology for sexual freedom and, 
rumour had it, wanted to force his wife to live with his mistress” (LE, 67). 
Furthermore for Bataille, although “Blake was in no way a philosopher,” 
he “pronounced the essential with a vigour and a precision that might 
make a philosopher envious” (LE, 75) – with “visionary writings” that also 
offered “no opposition to the clarity which psychoanalysis would like to 
introduce,” despite the often “dreamlike incoherence” (LE, 73). Bataille 
cites for example the 1793 Marriage of Heaven and Hell, where, Blake 
writes, almost anticipating with exactitude Bataille’s own position: “Good 
is the passive that obeys reason. Evil is the active springing from Energy,” 
but “Energy is the only life, and is from the Body; and Reason is the bound 
or outward circumference of Energy” (LE, 75). And the message for 
Bataille of Blake’s conclusion, here: that “Energy is eternal delight” – is that 
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“instead of turning away from Evil, man should look it boldly in the face” 
(LE, 75).  
Blake’s refusal to look away from what Judeo/Christian-Platonic 
metaphysics often crudely mislabelled ‘evil’ in the moralistic sense was 
because, Bataille notes, “in Blake’s life the joy of the senses was a 
touchstone” – such that “sensuality set him against the primacy of reason” 
and he “condemned the moral law in the name of sensuality” (LE, 75). 
This condemnation is evident in a line of Blake’s, which could have fitted 
perfectly in Nietzsche’s 1888 The Anti-Christ a century later, which reads: 
“As the caterpillar chooses the fairest leaves to lay her eggs on, so the 
priest lays his curse on the fairest joys” – which Bataille reads resolutely 
as calling for “sensual happiness, for the exuberance of the body” (LE, 75). 
Nietzsche, of course, had similarly noted, in his sustained genealogical 
critique of Judeo-Christianity, that where the priest appears to formalise 
life’s affairs it is always “to denaturalise them,” which curses their natural, 
animal, biological instincts while pretending instead to “sanctify them.”11 
The term “Evil” for Bataille still does valuable work in the world of 
Blake, however, for it serves to affirm a difference from “that subterfuge 
which denies true sensuality by seeing it solely as health” – and is rather 
“on the side of Energy, which is Evil, which restores it to its deepest 
significance” (LE, 75). And this significance is evidenced for Bataille in 
Blake’s anti-transcendentalising of marriage and love, when he writes: “In 
a wife I would desire / What in whores is always found – The lineaments 
of Gratified desire” (LE, 76). The findings since of psychoanalysis, and 
Lacan’s debunking of the “Woman with a capital W indicating the 
universal” as an eternal purity, of which “there’s no such thing,” because 
“she is not-whole” – should help to demonstrate that one should not at all 
assume that Blake has only professed a “masculine,” “active” desire here.12 
Rather, along with Bataille’s own work, Blake is giving expression to what 
Lacan calls the “no sexual relation” (SXVII, 116), the absence of any pre-
given rapport between the sexes “in copulation” linked to the Good, as if it 
were “nature’s intentions that this form a whole, a sphere” (SXVII, 33). For 
the animal impulses of sex will always subsist and appear shockingly 
perverse from the lofty vantage of the Good, which demonises difference 
due to an inflationary structure that is little more than a dream.13 
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Bataille, nevertheless, concludes his treatment of Blake problematising 
his comments on the Terror of the French Revolution – referring to the 
“fearful symmetry” (LE, 77) in Blake’s The Tyger which, in the poem 
Europe, as the “furious terrors flew around” in the “vineyards of red 
France,” “couch upon the prey & suck the ruddy tide” (LE, 79). Bataille 
finds that Blake here has “exalted the blind release of brute force” as a 
“divine form of excess,” as “portions of eternity too great for the eye of 
man” (LE, 78) – which in revolutions is too opposed to the “dictates of 
Reason,” Bataille notes, and “does not lead to any coherent attitude” but 
“poetic disorder” (LE, 79).14 So Bataille is without finding total resolution in 
Blake, as inspirational as he was, of the question of violence contained in 
Evil, adding complexity to the “insoluble contradiction” (LE, 78) between 
“happiness” of taboo and “happiness (or ‘evil’)” of transgression that by 
thinking literature we are discussing. A resolution, then, might be sought 
in Bataille’s turn to the poetic works of his dissident surrealist colleagues 
of interwar Paris. 
 
3.  Poetry reopens Sovereignty from the rut of Literature  
This section will see in what sense for Bataille the more recent poetry of 
his surrealist contemporaries restores a more positive sense of 
immediacy with the real of our drives, and thereby leads to their more 
lucid co-relation with the rational world of discourse which, Bataille 
contends, prose literature leaves us alienated within. We examine his 
discussions of Jacques Prévert and René Char – to look further into this 
irreducible conflict of law and transgression.  
By going further into poetic immediacy, we are also in a sense 
following the premise of Lacan’s Ethics which suggests going “more 
deeply” into “the real,” instead of into “the ideal” or “unreal” as per the 
manner of “superficial opinion” (SVII, 11). For by better understanding the 
real first, the ideals we later construct in response are more likely to be 
better informed, secured, rooted, and thereby eschew the unconscious 
“guilt” and “catastrophes” of “neurosis and its consequences” where, 
Lacan observes, “desire keeps coming back” and “demands insistently 
that the debt be paid” (SVII, 319). And part of what Lacan’s Ethics also 
provides is a focused reading of the Antigone work of the poet Sophocles, 
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to help illuminate a truer picture of the real of desire 15 – just as Bataille’s 
aim in his own examination of poetic immediacy is now to further 
illuminate desire therein. But Bataille’s ultimate aim in this is to later find a 
more ideal delineation between times for taboo or moral-rational law, and 
spaces for transgression with the return of repressed desire – to enable a 
knowing conduit, a clear path, and lucid relation between the two realms, 
which more thoughtful literature can contribute to.  
Beginning with Bataille’s 1946 Critique article, “From the Stone Age 
to Jacques Prévert,” we can see that by invoking the stone age, Bataille’s 
sense is that “the poetic effect brought about by Prévert’s texts take us 
back from our time” to the early “stammerings of humanity” (WS, 147). 
This is key for Bataille’s attempt to recover the archaic know-how of pre-
Christian-Platonic cultures in regulating separate times for the sacred and 
the profane: where the sacred moment was that of transgression and 
profane time marked return to taboos. The sacred and profane dynamic 
is what corresponds to transgression and taboo when viewed through 
early religion’s lens – which Bataille developed with his College of 
Sociology cofounder Roger Callois in the 1930s, following the 
anthropology of Marcel Mauss.16 It shows how the sacred once involved 
transgression that both deified and went deeper into our repressed 
animality, as opposed to the later Christian-Platonic dualism: with roots in 
the Judaic and Orphic-Pythagorean traditions respectively – which 
instead has the sacred trying to further purify, transcend, escape further 
away. And it is expressly the role of poetry in early religion that is here 
Bataille’s focus in discussing Prévert – “who is not part of the literary 
scene,” “writes for the cinema,” and “prefers films to books because he is 
attracted by what is immediate” (WS, 140) – to see how this enables a 
return of the real of our pent-up animality instead. 
Bataille invokes how “powerful emotion has always been 
expressed poetically,” how it could never be “expressed absolutely” or 
“translated into words” except if it were “by means of poetry,” where “every 
emotion was sung out” – even calling purely literary poetry, which Greek 
tragedy originally never was, “a sort of mutilated song” (WS, 137). This 
speaks to Nietzsche’s thesis of the “birth of tragedy out of the spirit of 
music,” the full title of his first work.17 For Bataille suggests that “what 
cannot be sung is outside the domain of poetry,” referring to its 
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“antipodes” of such things as “business affairs” (WS, 138) – where clear, 
deterministic language and behaviour is required. It is in this linguistic 
sense that poetry, with its endlessly potent metaphors, is, for Bataille, 
“literature which is no longer literary,” which “escapes from the rut in 
which literature is genuinely entrapped” as it “undercuts the desire in us to 
reduce things to the dimensions of reason” (WS, 138). But this is only if we 
are “touched by a sovereign emotion,” Bataille notes, which takes “the 
actuality of men outside the self” – where here in ecstasy the 
“overwhelming power of poetry” is to “communicate the condition of the 
poet” (WS, 138). It is thus for Bataille that “poetry gives expression to what 
exceeds the possibilities of common language” and “uses words to 
overturn the order of words” – as the “cry of what, within us, cannot be 
reduced; what, within us, is stronger than us” (WS, 138). And in this 
irreducibility he can also be seen as intimating what in Lacan is the 
“intimate exteriority or ‘extimacy’ that is the Thing” – which is the drive in 
the real made visible, as Lacan also notes, on the “cave walls” of 
“prehistoric art” (SVII, 139).18 
Bataille speaks further to this primal poetic state of immediacy in 
his later 1953 Critique article “René Char and the Force of Poetry” (WS, 
129-34). And in speaking now of force, Bataille begins with a contrast 
between “confined existence” and “sovereign existence” (WS, 129) – with 
the force of poetry belonging to the latter. This is what he defines as “not 
in the service of any enterprise, not even of its own egoistic interest” (WS, 
129). But the difference between this disinterest and, say, Kant’s notion of 
“aesthetic disinterest,” is that there is nothing transcendental about 
Bataille’s sovereignty. It goes deeper into the subject’s drives, rather than 
cathect metonymically to the cognitive functions of understanding, 
inflating as they do in Kant’s aesthetics to grasp the imagination which 
“takes the lead” in creative “free-play.”19 This itself remains an imaginary 
aesthetics while still under the sway of “denaturalising,” altruistic, 
immortal souls in the Christian heaven, categorically centred on the 
Good, which is sheer escapism from the optic of the much more 
Nietzschean and Dionysian Bataille.20 For Bataille’s aesthetic sovereignty 
corresponds to the earlier Pre-Christian-Platonic force of the sacred, 
involving religiously sanctioned transgression both aesthetic and erotic in 
kind, returning repressed bodilyness as “poetic and divine though animal” 
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(E, 153). And we can see the difference in the fable Lacan finds in Kant, 
where Kant believes “the gallows” set up outside the chambers of a 
woman of erotic appeal would be a “sufficient deterrent” (SVII, 108): For 
“our philosopher from Konigsberg was a nice person,” Lacan notes, and 
unaware of what Freud would call the “overvaluation of the object” or 
“object sublimation” in the realm of the senses (SVII, 109).21 
The alienation of humanity in an “anti-natural” state by Kant and the 
Christian tradition would drive Nietzsche to despair of the “whole labour 
of the ancient world in vain” (AC, 25, 59).22 But “‘Solitary tears are not 
wasted,’” the cry from Char rings out, whom Bataille now cites referring to 
how “‘the task of poetry, through its eye and on the tongue of its palate, is 
to cause this alienation to vanish by revealing how ridiculous it is’” (WS, 
130). Char writes of how “‘we still manage to rise up up up,’” “‘exploding 
with our execrations as much as with our loins’” – the “‘instant when 
beauty,’” made to wait by the necessities of confined existence, “‘rises 
from common things,’” “‘connects everything,’” “‘inflames all’” (WS, 130). 
“Nothing tempers this plenitude,” Bataille notes, and in invoking the 
“exuberance” of this beauty in the plenitude of its sovereignty, we have 
reference not only to Blake but to the “abundance” of natural instinct 
Nietzsche held to constitute the genuine aesthetic state – over-against the 
depersonalised lack of Kant’s – bestowing to things from libidinalised 
fullness.23 This also speaks to the aesthetic process of sublimation Lacan 
articulates in Freud, which involves satisfaction of the drive without so 
much perversion or repression through a higher valuation of an earthly 
object in signifying proximity to the Freudian Thing.24 Lacan playfully 
defines sublimation, then, as “raising an object” “to the dignity of the 
Thing” (SVII, 112). But the difference between Lacan’s Freudian Thing, 
which he often calls das Ding, and Kant’s thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich), 
which it is a play on too, is, as Russell Grigg notes, that the Thing is “the 
real” normally excluded from ordinary symbolic representations that can 
still return to interrupt them, “intruding into the subject’s experience in a 
way that finds him or her devoid of any means of protection,” forcing 
through the speaking body that ineluctably we all are.25 
Here Bataille turns his treatment of Char’s force into what could be 
considered a Lacanian ontology, invoking the poetic as an opening to the 
impossible – which is one of the terms Lacan uses to describe the real 
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himself, as both impossible to integrate and “the pre-historic Other that is 
impossible to forget” (SVII, 71). But Bataille notes the feeling of “insipidity” 
attending “the possible” our existence depends on, reminding us of our 
existence beyond its confined normal limits: For if we always “limited 
ourselves to what is possible,” he explains, then we “remain enclosed, 
moribund,” in “banishment from the totality of being” where we are 
instead “exceeding the limits of the possible and going to the point of 
death” (WS, 131). This invokes Bataille’s formulation of the erotic as 
“assenting to life to the point of death,” which he not only makes in his 
1957 Literature and Evil chapter on Brontë but also in his definitive 
Eroticism work of the same year. And for Bataille, whether it is as literature 
or life, it is “our whims, and this taste for the impossible,” that “alone signify 
that we can never concede the separation of the individual fixed in the 
feeble limits of the possible” (WS, 131). 
Bataille then affirms Char’s reference to the “‘fear, irony, and 
anguish’” elicited by the “‘presence of the poet who bears the poem’” as 
“‘not mistaken,’” for it is only the “‘pure happiness’” at risk here that 
corresponds to Bataille’s first happiness of confined taboo-governed self-
interest – which on its own, Char adds, is merely “‘happiness screened 
from the eyes and its own nature’” (WS, 131-2). This is where Bataille 
again in proto-Lacanian terms refers to “the impossible” as “what we 
lack,” but also as that “by which we restore” by transgressing the limits 
invoking “death,” “obscenity,” and a “totality” that “causes us to tremble,” is 
“completely other,” and “gives us a sacred shiver” (WS, 132). And Bataille’s 
distinct emphasis on not retreating before this sacred shiver, by vehicle of 
the poetic in literature, is from his conviction that “today humanity sees its 
right to exceed the possible in a sovereign way denied” – but through his 
poetry he finds that “Char’s morality” is the “calm exuberance” that 
“reminds sovereign man that nothing can prevail against him” (WS, 132).  
Bataille had earlier finished his Prévert article with similar 
sentiments, having sojourned through early religion’s use of poetry to 
invoke the sacred and the logic of sacrifice – sacrificing words and things 
alike from their normal use-value, committing them to desire’s flame. As 
opposed to today, Bataille laments, where “present day society is vulgar 
and constructed from man’s flight from himself” – where he “hides behind 
a set design” such that “poetry that evokes this society” “is also the 
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negation of it” (WS, 153). Society is obviously not something to completely 
negate, but without separate yet coordinated times for workaday taboos 
and sublimated spaces for subsequent transgression, we will never 
escape this difference between the two forms of happiness involved 
emerging as a devastating conflict. To further allay this conflict, then, we 
will conclude by augmenting Bataille’s preferred aesthetics of literature – 
which puts it on the side of transgression in relation to the taboos it 
violates – with Lacan’s tripartite episteme of the real, symbolic, and 
imaginary, read as constituting in their entirety what Bataille invokes as 
the “totality of being” (WS, 130).  
 
Conclusion: Separation and Connection of Two Realms in The Real.  
This article set out to examine Bataille’s treatment of literature, including 
the novel, and soon came upon his fundamental position in aesthetics 
which not only discerns the key tendencies in literature, but also offers a 
distinct program to clarify and improve them. What began, then, with a 
discerned quest for “happiness” in literature soon took on a dual structure 
ensconcing us in “evil” – that is, in the periodic transgression of our 
fundamental taboos as necessary to happiness as the taboos themselves 
– of which poetic literature in particular affording insight.  
In Lacanian terms, Bataille’s articulation of this taboo-transgression 
co-relation in literature, including the greater clarity of consciousness 
about it he calls for, is the work of the Lacanian register of the symbolic: of 
clear, conceptual use of words which are rational, knowledge based, and 
where Bataille as philosopher, scholar, reviewer of scholarly works and 
editor of a journal normally exists – as do we ourselves – in the space 
governed by every day, workaday, moral taboos. But immediately Bataille 
comes across a contrary need for transgression of these taboos: for 
taboos create a distance from the real of our animal-bodily drives 
registered in terms of enjoyment, and the demand for the latter is a debt 
that also, periodically, needs to be repaid. What this article has 
demonstrated, then, is that this debt to the real is repaid in the imaginary 
register – creatively through the transgressive works of arts such as 
literature – opening up subjective possibilities in the real usually excluded 
for being impossible.26  
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There are a number of postwar articles in Critique, and elsewhere, 
where Bataille gives us further perceptive formulations of this dual 
necessity between taboo (the symbolic relation to the real) and 
transgression (the return of repressed real in the imaginary) – equating 
roughly to our separate times for work and play, politics and art, or reason 
and the unconscious respectively. Bataille writes, for instance, of “Marx’s 
doctrine” as “the only effective application of intelligence to practical facts 
as a whole” insofar as it brings “the sort of clear-cut decision that a 
science brings into a particular domain” (WS, 156). But he also quotes the 
surrealist Jean Maquet declaring that “after the experience of the past 
twenty years, it would today be a radical-socialist stupidity to refuse to 
save a place for a Pascal or a Rimbaud,” a “Baudelaire, Nietzsche, 
Dostoyevsky or Chestov” (WS, 128). This is because again, for Bataille, “no 
one can neglect this problem” concerning these two different but 
equiprimordial modes of being: For “it is a question of mankind’s harmony 
with itself, of poetry’s harmony with what is useful, and the harmony of the 
passions with material needs” (WS, 157).27  
In thinking this harmony, we have found Bataille concerned with 
“the necessities of the path, the bridge, between the two domains” – 
where, as he puts it, we take “account of material needs” but also give 
“the passions, which only poetry generally welcomes, a place and 
necessity in the ordering of the industrial world” and formulate “a project 
of productive organisation in which poetry would not be immediately 
expelled, as it usually is” (WS, 157). This expressly invokes Nietzsche’s 
critique of Plato’s barring of poets from the ideal Republic – as the 
metaphysical origins of our failure to get the balance right in the various 
traditions ensuing in the West (GM, III:25).28 I suggest that to get this 
balance right is a matter of the right distance-and-nearness between the 
two domains, appended to how the processes of sublimation 
underpinning these two key aspects of civilisation amount to a different 
optimum of distance-nearness to the Freudian Thing – as articulated by 
Lacan’s  focus on its unconscious signifying aspects by distinguishing 
“the Trieb [drive]” from “the Instinkt [instinct]” (SVII, 90, 112). Science and 
rationality could almost “foreclose” the Thing with its critical symbolic 
distance, while art in the imaginary should be “encircling” closer (SVII, 
129-31, 141). And we sense the delicate balances involved when Bataille 
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is critical not just of Sartre’s attempt to make literature serve a predefined 
political commitment, which takes it too far from the Thing and means 
renunciation, but also of an “art for art’s sake” movement that zeros in too 
close – which in the case of surrealism could lead to what Bataille saw as 
an “empty liberty,” “monotonous” and “powerless” (WS, 180).29  
What Bataille wants is a kind of affirmation of this empty liberty by 
the intelligence that experiences it, which gets us close as possible to the 
Thing with enough knowledge of it to not get burnt. And we can see this 
when he commends the painter André Masson who, like “Rimbaud or 
Blake” before him, “did not dissociate poetic vision from intelligence” – 
which made his work “distanced from pure surrealism” as “the thought it 
expresses is no longer, as in automatic writing, disengaged with the 
world,” but is “integrated with it and invades it” (WS, 181). Masson’s work, 
then, for Bataille, has “a quality of totality” that is “limited neither by 
discursive thought nor by the automatism of the dream,” which is why 
Bataille condemned the critic who said of it, “We do not want thought 
painting” (WS, 178). I have shown in this article that Bataille would have 
similar rebukes for those critics who would say the same about literature 
and properly wholistic attempts to think the novel.  
Getting this distance-nearness relation right is of course never easy, 
and Bataille laments how forever “the antagonism between poetry and 
consciousness (the latter connected to reason) is at the heart of our lives,” 
where “consciousness experiences what really slips away” – such as with 
“sexual pleasure,” which is “given to man only in the night,” “in our 
intimate returns to the pink depths of life” (WS, 125). But consciousness 
can still be more connected than not by the intelligent author, as we 
might see evidenced in Bataille’s description of the copulations of 
Madame Edwarda in his own novel, with Bataille himself actually seeing 
“Chazal as the first writer to achieve the equivalence of sexual pleasure 
and language” (WS, 126). Bataille quotes Chazal writing about sexual 
pleasure as “‘the grey hound race of desire,’” as “‘time assassinated for a 
moment and rendered invisible with touch,’” as that which “enables us to 
taste through the other’s palate” (WS, 195) – while in his own more darkly 
toned Madame Edwarda, Bataille writes of her jouissance with the driver 
in the backseat of a taxi, during which Bataille supported her quivering 
body from the nape of her neck as “that stream of luxury,” that “glorified 
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her being unceasingly,” made her “more naked” and “her lewdness ever 
more intimate.”30 In Lacanian terms, what matters is only that we fasten 
the real, symbolic and imaginary in a conscientious way with our own 
singularly enhanced levels of knowledge and experience of jouissance – 
with different emphases in place during the times for work, reason, and 
taboo, and during the times for artistic, erotic play and transgression.  
Having come, then, by way of conclusion, to literature and the 
novel being a place for the transgressive release of normally prohibited 
drives, acts, thoughts, and behaviours connected to our intimate animality 
– we should commend Bataille for having shed his light on this process, 
which will hopefully, on the basis of this work, shine ever more radiantly in 
future works, and in our reappraisals of those gone past. An enhanced 
clarity of the distance and nearness of the poetic-literary with the rational-
prosaic and productive, and the two different but equally necessary forms 
of happiness involved, is what we have seen here is more than possible – 
in a way that relieves us of the burden of deeming impossible more of the 
real than we otherwise could, while relegating it to “evil.” If there is to be 
something of a politics of the novel, let it be, then, as a hyper-ethics – as 
an ethics which is also an erotics enhancing the consciousness and 
enjoyment demonstrated in the depths of the real-orientated thinking 
here.   
 
“These studies are the result of my attempts to extract the essence 
of literature.” 
– Bataille, “Preface,” Literature and Evil (1957). 
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